Who Profits from Innovation in Global Value Chains? A Study of the iPod and Notebook PCs by Dedrick, Jason et al.
 
 
 
 
INDUSTRY STUDIES ASSOCATION 
WORKING PAPER SERIES 
 
Who Profits from Innovation in Global Value Chains?  
A Study of the iPod and Notebook PCs  
 
By 
 
Jason Dedrick 
Personal Computing Industry Center 
University of California, Irvine 
Irvine, CA 92697 
jdedrick@uci.edu 
 
and 
 
Kenneth L. Kraemer   
Personal Computing Industry Center 
University of California, Irvine 
Irvine, CA 92697 
kkraemer@uci.edu 
 
and 
 
Greg Linden 
Personal Computing Industry Center 
University of California, Irvine 
Irvine, CA 92697 
and 
University of California, Berkeley 
Berkeley, CA 94720 
glinden@berkeley.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008 
Industry Studies Association 
Working Papers 
 
WP-2008-15 
http://isapapers.pitt.edu/ 
 
 
2 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The power of innovation to create economic value and reward pioneers with exceptional profits 
is a deeply-held belief of inventors, entrepreneurs, investors and the public.  Innovation can 
enrich companies and individuals and sometimes disrupt entire industries.  Yet many studies 
have shown that the value from innovation is often captured by someone other than the original 
innovator, whether by imitators, suppliers of key components, intellectual property owners, or 
providers of related products and services.1  In an era when new ideas are brought to the market 
by networks of specialists rather than by one company, a key question is who captures the most 
value from innovation in such a structure, and why? 
 
Many of the best examples of such a dispersed innovation network are to be found in the 
electronics industry.  For decades, the industry was dominated by large companies like IBM, HP, 
Toshiba, Fujitsu and Philips that designed and built their own products, often using internally-
produced components and proprietary technologies developed in large R&D labs.  Even as 
Silicon Valley-type startups flourished in personal computers, software and semiconductors, the 
large vertically integrated companies created and captured a large share of the value of 
innovation in electronics into the 1990s.  
 
Since then, there has been a shift by firms in many industries to focus on core competencies and 
outsource other activities, creating global production networks or value chains that cross 
corporate and national boundaries (Dedrick & Kraemer, 1998; Gereffi et al., 2005).  In the 
prominent case of the electronics industry, this has taken the form of modular production 
networks, in which the interfaces between firms are clearly codified (Sturgeon, 2002).2  
Companies that formerly manufactured most products in-house, as well as start-ups that never 
had manufacturing capabilities, have outsourced production, and even product development, to 
turn-key suppliers known as contract manufacturers (CMs) and original design manufacturers 
(ODMs). 
 
Today, the creation and production of a successful product in one of these global value chains 
spreads wealth far beyond the lead firm, i.e. the company whose brand appears on the product, 
and who bears primary responsibility for conceiving, coordinating, and marketing new products.  
While the lead firm and its shareholders are the main intended beneficiaries of the firm’s 
strategic planning, other beneficiaries include partners in the firm’s supply chain.  Firms that 
offer complementary products or services may also benefit, possibly even more than the lead 
firm.   
 
This paper addresses the question of who benefits financially from innovation in global value 
chains by looking at specific products.  This product-level approach allows us to break out the 
financial value embedded in an innovative product and clarify how it is distributed across the 
many participants in the supply chain from design and branding to component manufacturing to 
                                                
1 See Mitchell (1991) and Rosenbloom and Christensen (1994) for discussions of how newcomers and 
industry incumbents fare following the introduction of innovations. 
2 Baldwin and Clark (2000) called these modular clusters, but their work abstracts from the spatial 
distribution of the activities. 
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assembly to distribution and sales.  We apply a novel methodology for measuring the distribution 
of value across the supply chains for two models from Apple’s iPod family and notebook PC 
models from Lenovo and Hewlett-Packard (HP).  These are all examples of globally innovated 
products, combining technologies from the U.S., Japan, and other countries.  They all are 
assembled in China, mostly by Taiwanese CMs and ODMs.  
 
Our analysis of these four products shows that the gross margins of Apple for its high-end iPod 
products are generally higher than those earned by HP and Lenovo for notebook PCs, but not so 
high as to be considered “supernormal.”  A key reason for the difference is that Apple’s control 
of the core software, proprietary standards and complementary infrastructure of the iPod enables 
it to retain greater profits, whereas a large share of the PC industry profits are siphoned off to 
Microsoft and Intel, whose ownership of valuable standards allows them to charge a considerable 
price premium.  Other “winners” (earners of above-average profits) include suppliers of key 
logic microchips, while suppliers of other high-value inputs like hard drives and high-resolution 
displays face severe competition that limits their margins to much lower levels even though they 
produce two of the highest value components in an iPod or notebook PC. 
 
We consider these results in the context of the theory on profiting from innovation.  While the 
theory is largely confirmed by our research, we also note several distinctions, such as the 
commoditization of manufacturing.  Also, contrary to recent suggestions in the literature, we find 
no evidence of a causal link between product and industry architectures.  Instead, there is a vast 
electronics “industry architecture” that can easily support product-level value chain 
configurations ranging from modular to integrated.  As posited by Pisano and Teece (2007), a 
critical capability in this environment is system integration.  
 
We begin by reviewing the literature on profiting from innovation for insights into the basic 
elements that determine which entities ultimately capture a significant share of the profits from 
an innovation.  These insights frame the analysis and guide the interpretation of results. 
Subsequent sections describe the framework for measuring and mapping the financial value 
created along a supply chain (Linden et al., 2007b), apply it to our four products, and analyze the 
comparative results. Finally, we offer implications of the analysis for firms and managers. 
 
II. Profiting from Innovation 
 
Much of the literature on profiting from innovation builds on Teece’s (1986) analytical model 
and asks “which entities ultimately capture significant shares of the available profits from a 
particular innovation” (Teece, 2006: 1136).  Here we review Teece’s model and its implications 
for capturing value in the electronics industry. 
 
The Teece Model of Profiting from Innovation 
 
Teece’s original model has three basic elements: stages of technical evolution, an appropriability 
regime, and complementary assets.  In addition, researchers have identified “industry 
architecture” as another key strategic variable (Jacobides, et al., 2006; Pisano & Teece, 2007).  
 
The key evolutionary question is whether the market has embraced a dominant design 
(Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Anderson & Tushman, 1990).  In the early stages of an industry, 
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a variety of product solutions may be introduced with no clear leader.  Once the market has 
chosen a winning set of product characteristics (e.g., form factor, function set), less design 
heterogeneity is possible and competition becomes more price-based.  The early phase often 
amounts to standards-based competition (David & Greenstein, 1990), in which groups of firms 
promoting alternative offerings in a single product space try to build sufficient market presence 
to become the dominant standard.3  
 
The second issue highlighted by Teece is appropriability.  Pisano and Teece (2007) discuss the 
strategic aspects of appropriability regimes such as intellectual property rights and industry 
standards organizations that can limit competition in a technology segment and protect firm 
profits. 
 
In cases where innovation is distributed across multiple companies, the most profitable company 
will be one with control of “one or more of the standards by which the entire information 
package is assembled” (Morris & Ferguson, 1993: 87).  The classic case here is the IBM PC, 
which became the first widely adopted PC and the dominant design for the industry, but in which 
more profits were ultimately captured by Intel and Microsoft than IBM.   
 
The third foundational element of the Teece model is complementarity.  For many electronics 
products, a key factor is the availability of goods that enable or enhance their functionality.  For 
instance, computers need software, and DVD players need pre-recorded movies.  Without one, 
the other has no value to the user.  Complements need not be indispensable, as in the instance of 
fashionable cases for an iPod.  The innovating firms must decide whether to produce the 
complement itself or to rely on others to do so (Jacobides, et al., 2006). 
 
Complements differ in terms of asset specificity.  Generic complements, such as most electronics 
components, are readily redeployable.  Unilaterally specialized complements, such as accessories 
using the iPod’s unique connector, are dependent on the main product, but not vice-versa. Co-
specialized complements, such as plastic moulds for unique product enclosures, involve mutual 
dependence. 
 
The role of complementors has assumed a special place in the innovation literature, because 
firms today must work with widely distributed innovation networks to bring new ideas to market.  
Innovators need to coordinate to varying degrees with a large number of allied firms to ensure a 
supply of complements, while also positioning themselves to capture as much as possible of the 
value that is created. 
 
The most recent extension of the model is to the overall industry structure, or architecture.  An 
industry architecture is defined as a set of technical and social interfaces that provide a 
framework in which firms in an industry interact (Jacobides et al., 2006).  Firms may be able to 
shape the architecture of their industry by internalizing a vital complementary activity or by 
supporting competition and innovation among complementors.   
 
                                                
3 In some cases, multiple standards may co-exist in the market after a dominant design (e.g. a product 
architecture) has become apparent.  Examples include the competition between IBM-compatible and 
Macintosh PCs, or between different video game standards. 
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This phenomenon of leveraged innovation has been given a variety of names, such as platforms 
(Gawer & Cusamano, 2002), keystones (Iansiti & Levien, 2004), small footprints (Baldwin & 
Clark, 2006), and architectural advantage (Jacobides, et al., 2006).  In each case, the focal firm is 
able to realize profits by providing a high-appropriability product or service that becomes a key 
element of the innovations of other firms.  Examples include Intel’s processors and Sony’s 
PlayStation consoles. 
 
Applying the Model to the Electronics Industry 
 
Dominant designs, appropriability, complementarity, and industry architectures are all well 
represented in the electronics industry. 
 
The overarching question facing innovators and their allied firms is how to ensure that they are 
part of a widely-adopted technology platform so that there is a substantial profits “pie” to share 
in, while also trying to maximize their share of that pie.  No one wants to capture the largest 
share of a small or disappearing pie, as Sony did with the Betamax but no one wants to capture a 
declining share of a large pie as happened to IBM, which finally sold its unprofitable PC division 
in 2004.  The Betamax case illustrates the importance of establishing a dominant standard that 
can generate ongoing profits for the entire innovation network.  The IBM case shows that 
winning a standards battle does not guarantee success if a defensible appropriability regime is 
not maintained and the innovator loses market power.   
 
Within the electronics industry, market power can be situated almost anywhere in the value chain 
of a particular product, from upstream component suppliers to branded lead firms, or even to 
service providers such as mobile phone carriers.  Borrus and Zysman (1997) dub this 
phenomenon “Wintelism” in a nod to the paradigmatic case of Microsoft’s Windows software 
and Intel’s processors as the leading profit engines in the PC industry.  
 
The flip side of Wintelism is that most firms even in a successful value chain have little market 
power.  Beyond the elite high-earners, the electronics industry is populated by a vast array of 
companies whose components and services can serve a variety of end markets, from cheap 
consumer products to mission-critical medical devices, and who compete aggressively with each 
other for every design win.  The presence of all these competing suppliers allows lead firms to 
use a multi-sourcing strategy (or the threat of doing so) to drive down price.  In its turn, the 
presence of multiple lead firms with access to the same low-cost supply base leads to fierce 
competition.  On average, there is little difference in the returns earned by systems firms and 
component suppliers in the electronics industry.4 
 
Complementarity is a reality throughout the electronics industry, especially outside the small 
number of firms, primarily in Japan, that have remained vertically integrated.  Systems firms 
must assemble a partner network for everything from components to distribution and 
differentiate themselves through design, software, branding, distribution know-how, or other 
                                                
4 Our analysis of financial data for the top 300 electronics firms from 1999 to 2004, as reported in the 
Electronic Business EB 300 listings from 2000 to 2005 (accessed at http://www.edn.com/), showed the 
average gross margin for systems firms to be 35 percent versus 33 percent for component suppliers. 
 
 
6 
means.  Component suppliers compete by providing support infrastructure (software, reference 
design kits, etc.) to speed their customers’ products to market. 
 
The architecture literature to date can be difficult to apply in practice because it tends to be 
vague as to level of analysis.  In some cases it seems to encompass an entire industry, in others, 
just the value chain of a single lead firm.  Even the definition of industry is open to 
interpretation.  For example, it is possible to speak of “the electronics industry,” “the PC 
industry,” “the notebook PC industry,” or “the hard disk drive industry.”  Each of these is a 
subset of the one preceding it, but with different dominant firms and different dynamics. 
 
Another confusion in this literature surrounds the relationship between industry architectures and 
dominant designs.  For Pisano and Teece (2007), product architecture leads to industry 
architecture: “there is a strong connection between the architecture of the industry and the 
architecture of physical products and technologies.  The computer industry evolved from a 
‘vertical’ to a ‘horizontal’ architecture because of the modular technological architecture of the 
PC” (p.283, emphasis added).  For Jacobides, et al. (2006), the causality seems to flow the other 
way: “Our approach suggests that dominant designs may be the result of particular industry 
architectures” (footnote 16 on p.1211).  We will revisit this issue after presenting our research. 
 
Our research expands the winner-take-all narrative that characterizes much of the profiting from 
innovation literature by developing a much finer view focused on the “relative” profitability of 
different participants in the industry value chain.  We do this by measuring the distribution of 
profits from two widely adopted electronics products: notebook computers and portable music 
players.  We use product teardowns to estimate the value captured by the most important firms in 
the innovation and production networks of each product.  We then explain “why” these particular 
firms capture such value using an industry-level analysis and the profiting from innovation 
concepts. 
 
III. Methodology: Measuring Who Captures Value in Global Value Chains 
 
In this section, we describe a generic value chain, which we use as the basis for introducing a 
method of calculating value capture by the companies in the chain. 
 
Value Chain Analysis 
 
Within a value chain, each producer purchases inputs and then adds value, which becomes a cost 
of the next stage of production.  The sum of the value added by everyone in the chain equals the 
final product price.  The natural starting point for estimating these values is a map of a value 
chain showing the activities (manufacturing, design and branding, and distribution, sales and 
service) involved in passing from component suppliers to final customers (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1: Generic Electronics Value Chain 
 
Although each product incorporates a large number of components (in the case of a notebook 
computer, thousands), the large majority are low-value parts, such as capacitors and resistors that 
cost less than a penny each.  Although the suppliers of these components earn profits, they 
account for a small share of the total value added along the value chain, and typically compete 
with close substitutes, which eliminates the potential for above-normal profits.  
 
Most electronics products also contain a few high-value components, such as a visual display, 
hard drive or key integrated circuits.  These components, which are themselves complicated 
systems, are the most likely to embody proprietary knowledge that helps to differentiate the final 
product and to command a commensurately high margin.  By virtue of their high cost, these few 
inputs will usually account for a relatively large share of total value added.  Innovation is rapid in 
these components, and accounts for much of the steady technological improvement in final 
products such as the iPod or notebook PCs. 
 
These complex components may have their own multinational supply chains.  For example, an 
integrated circuit might be sold by a U.S. company but fabricated by a contractor in Taiwan and 
encased in its final package in Korea before being shipped to a product assembly plant.  
 
In the case of a non-integrated systems firm like Apple, the manufacture of these components 
into the final product is done by a number of large multinational contract manufacturers (CMs) 
or original design manufacturers (ODMs) such as Flextronics, Solectron, Foxconn, Quanta, and 
Compal who provide assembly services.  These assemblers compete fiercely for high-volume 
opportunities, limiting their margins.  Even large vertically integrated manufacturers such as 
Sony and Toshiba now outsource part of their production to these CMs and ODMs. 
 
Product concept, branding and marketing is done by brand-name vendors.  These lead firms 
contribute market knowledge, intellectual property, system integration and cost management 
skills, and a brand name whose value reflects its reputation for quality, innovation, and customer 
service, for good or ill. 
 
Distribution is done by a few global wholesalers such as Arrow, TechData and IngramMicro, and 
many smaller national or local distributors.  Sales are by large retail chains such as Best Buy, 
Circuit City, and Fry’s, as well as by general retailers such as Costco and WalMart, and smaller 
local dealers.  They operate on a fixed margin from the vendor and seek scale and reach, but 
price competition plus high capital and operating costs keep net margins low.  Sales are also 
handled increasingly by the branded vendors directly online and in cases such as Apple and 
Sony, through their own stores.  The lower cost of direct sales contributes to the lead firm’s 
CM/ODM Retailers Distributors Customer
s 
Manufacturing Distribution, sales, 
customer service 
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IP, design, 
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margins, and own store sales may contribute to cross-selling as well.5  
 
Figure 2 expands this generic value chain for the iPod. 
 
Figure 2. Value Chain for an iPod 
 
 
 
 
Using maps like this as a guide, we calculate the value added at various stages of the value chain 
by estimating the selling price of that stage’s output and subtracting the cost of all purchased 
inputs.  The data and method are described fully in another report (Linden et al., 2007a) and 
briefly described next. 
 
Data Sources and Analytical Approach 
 
Product-level cost data are extremely hard to obtain directly from electronics firms, who 
jealously protect information about the pricing deals they have negotiated and often require the 
silence of their suppliers and contractors through non-disclosure agreements. 
 
For many electronic products, lists of components and their factory prices are available from 
industry analysts.  These “teardown” reports capture the composition of the product at a specific 
point in time.  A teardown report can be used to estimate a product’s value added by subtracting 
the input prices from the wholesale price, which must be estimated with additional research.   
                                                
5 Apple’s 10-K for the period ending for fiscal year ending September 30, 2006, states: “The Company’s 
direct sales, primarily through its retail and online stores, generally have higher associated profitability 
than its indirect sales” (p.30). 
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To estimate the value captured by suppliers, we use firm-level gross profit in dollars.  The ideal 
measure, value added, isn’t readily available because publicly-listed companies do not generally 
reveal the amount of their wages for “direct labor” (workers who are involved in converting 
inputs to a salable product).  Instead, the wage bill is hidden within “cost of goods sold” or “cost 
of sales.”  Therefore the number we use, “gross profit,” is the difference between “net sales” and 
“cost of goods sold.”  Gross profit data are readily available from annual reports in the case of 
public companies.  Figure 3 shows the difference between value added and gross profit.  The 
horizontally-striped area includes the components of value added and the smaller vertically-
striped area includes the components of gross profit, or value captured by the firm. 
 
Figure 3.  Components of Value Added and Gross Profit 
 
  - Purchased inputs   
  - Direct labor  
 - Cost of 
   goods sold 
Sales  - SG&A  - SG&A 
price  - R&D  - R&D 
  - Depreciation  - Depreciation 
  - Net profit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  - Net profit 
 
 
Gross profit does not equal the full value added, since it excludes direct labor.  The difference 
can be large or small, depending on the labor intensity (or outsourcing practices) of the firm.  
Instead, it measures the value the company (excluding its direct workers) captures from its role 
in the value chain, which it then can use to reward shareholders (dividends), invest in future 
growth (R&D), cover the cost of capital depreciation, and pay its overhead expenses (selling, 
general, and administration). 
 
To estimate market power, we also look at gross margin (gross profit divided by net sales).  
Market power for a supplier is the ability to charge more than the long-run competitive price 
level, which is a product’s average variable cost.6  In the economist’s ideal “perfectly 
competitive market,” prices are driven to this long-run level so that all firms earn zero economic 
profits.  The accounting profits reported in companies’ public financial reports, which we will be 
using here, do not reflect all costs related to a firm’s use of capital, so “normal” accounting profit 
even in a highly competitive market will be positive even though the corresponding “economic” 
profit is zero. 
 
To determine whether or not unusually high or low profits are present, we need to compare the 
returns of individual firms to some “normal” profit margin.  To estimate a normal margin, we 
calculated the average gross margin for 270 of the leading global electronics firms for 2004 as 
reported in Electronic Business’ EB 300 listing, which was 32.8 percent.7  
                                                
6 Average variable cost is variable costs (total costs minus fixed costs, or, equivalently, the costs that vary 
with the level of output) divided by the number of units produced. 
7 http://www.edn.com/article/CA630171.html?partner=eb Japan data were for fiscal year ending in March 
2004.  30 firms, mostly Chinese, did not provide “Cost of Sales (% of revenues)” data.  The median gross 
margin for the 270 firms was 28.6 percent, and the collective gross margin (the sum of gross profits 
divided by the sum of revenues) was 32 percent. 
Value 
added Gross profit 
(value capture) 
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The standard deviation of the gross margin was 19.55 percent, so, assuming a normal 
distribution, the range of 13.2 to 52.3 percent should cover about two-thirds of the sample, which 
it does.8  Gross margins above this range are supernormal, and margins significantly lower are 
subnormal. 
 
Inside Portable Electronics 
 
Apple’s iPod is essentially a portable computer dedicated to media processing.  As such, it shares 
general features with a range of related products, including notebook computers, cell phones, and 
PDAs.  These features include a display, a storage medium, microprocessors, system memory, an 
input interface, a battery, printed circuit boards (PCBs), a physical enclosure, and software.  
They all also require assembly services, which are today mostly outsourced. 
 
Using Portelligent teardown reports (Portelligent 2006, 2005b), we compared the key parts in 
one model of Apple’s iPod (30GB Video iPod from 2005) and a Hewlett-Packard notebook 
computer (nc6230, also from 2005).  Table 1 shows how the two systems compare in terms of 
their key inputs as a percentage of factory cost (the total of the inputs). 
 
Table 1.  Comparison of Inputs as Percentage of Factory Cost: 30GB Video iPod  
     and HP nc6230 notebook 
 
  Video iPod HP nc6230 
Software Not Applicable 12% 
Storage 51% 13% 
Display 16% 16% 
Processors 9% 27% 
Assembly 5% 3% 
Battery 2% 5% 
Memory 4% 4% 
PCBs 2% 3% 
Enclosure 2% 1% 
Input Device(s)9 1% 2% 
Subtotal for key components 90% 86% 
Hundreds of other components 10% 14% 
TOTAL 100% 100% 
Total Parts 451 2,196 
Note: iPod software was developed in-house by Apple so there is no software license fee in the bill of materials. 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
                                                
8 71 percent of the sample is within one standard deviation of the mean, with nearly the same number of 
firms above and below that range. 
9 “Input Device(s)” vary by product. For a notebook computer, it is the keyboard and trackpad (or other 
pointing device).  For the iPod, it is the scroll wheel. 
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One major difference is that software does not figure in Apple’s bill of materials.  The iPod’s 
software was developed in-house, which spares Apple from paying license or royalty fees on 
each unit sold.  In contrast, software licenses for the operating system and applications are a 
major part (11 percent for the HP nc6230) of the bill of materials for notebooks. 
 
Another key difference is that the iPod’s limited-purpose microprocessors are relatively 
inexpensive as a share of costs (9 percent) compared to the notebook’s general-purpose 
processor chipset (27 percent).  By contrast, the iPod’s storage system, a hard-disk drive, 
accounts for half of the factory cost compared to just 12 percent total in the notebook for the hard 
disk and DVD drives. 
 
Interestingly, the display module in each system worked out to 16 percent and the assembly 
services (including component insertion, board test, and final assembly) to 5 percent of the 
total.10  The circuit board, enclosures, and means of input account for a relatively small share in 
each case.  The hundreds of other components that occupy supporting roles in the two devices 
only amount to 11 to 15 percent of the total input cost. 
 
The details for these and two similar products (an earlier-model iPod and a Lenovo ThinkPad) 
are presented in four tables in the Appendix.  These tables show specific parts detail for the hard 
drive, the display assembly, the processor chips, the battery, and memory chips.  
 
The tables omit details for the PCBs, case, and input devices, as well as a host of smaller parts.  
Functionally, these parts might be very important for a particular product,11 but their cost is 
relatively low.  Their inclusion would not materially affect the results we report below. 
 
IV. Findings: Value Capture and Market Power along the Supply Chain  
 
As the component breakdowns above make clear, many companies contribute to every iPod and 
notebook personal computer (PC).  However, the price of the component a company provides 
does not correspond directly to the value that it captures, which is determined by the supplier’s 
cost of goods. 
 
We use the parts lists in Appendix tables A-1 to A-4 to estimate firm-specific value capture and 
market power for the iPod and notebook value chains.  These estimates are shown in the right-
hand column of the Appendix tables. 
 
Our basic procedure for deriving these values uses the gross profit rate of the company that 
supplies the part for the year the product was manufactured.  For a few smaller parts, we have 
had to make an educated guess about the firm that supplied the part and a representative gross 
profit rate (marked with asterisks in the tables).  These estimates, limited to the batteries in three 
of the products and the monochrome display in the 2003 iPod, do not materially affect the 
patterns of value capture discussed below because of the relatively small amounts involved. 
 
                                                
10 See below for a discussion of how the assembly total was estimated from Portelligent data. 
11 For example, the iPod’s case entails design finesse, requires great precision in its manufacture, and is a 
key part of the Apple brand image, but it’s a small proportion (2%) of the bill of materials. 
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The Video iPod--Illustration and Analysis 
 
We illustrate this approach to estimating value capture using the Video iPod (Appendix Table A-
2), starting with the inputs and moving on to the later stages of the value chain. 
 
 Inputs 
We begin with the hard drive, supplied by Toshiba.  The use of company-wide gross profit may 
be inaccurate for a company like Toshiba that makes a wide range of products, from memory 
chips to power-generating facilities, but it can suffice for a first approximation.  According to 
Toshiba’s income statements, its gross margin for the fiscal year ended March 2006 was 26.5 
percent of net sales.12  As points of comparison, the 2005 gross margins of the two top firms 
specializing in hard drives, Seagate and Western Digital, were 23.2 percent and 19.1 percent, 
respectively, confirming that this is a fiercely competitive industry.13  Using Toshiba’s overall 
gross margin, recognizing that it is on the high side for the hard drive industry, the value 
captured by Toshiba from the Video iPod is about $20.  
 
The Toshiba drive was a standard part with a standard ATA interface with little leverage despite 
the fact that Toshiba was the only major producer at the time Apple started up its iPod project 
(Sherman, 2002).  Hitachi brought out a 1.8-inch drive in 2003,14 but failed to gain much 
leverage in the market (17 percent market share to Toshiba’s 70 percent) and announced in late 
2007 that it would discontinue its 1.8-inch line.  Although Toshiba’s chief rival is exiting, Apple 
may maintain market power by threatening to eliminate hard drives in all iPod models in favor of 
the “flash” memory chips used in the iPod’s Nano, Shuffle and Touch lines. 
 
Moving to the next-most expensive input, the supplier probably didn’t fare much better.  The 
display used in the Video iPod was supplied by Toshiba-Matsushita Display, a joint venture.  
The estimated factory price was $23.27, and the average gross margin for Toshiba and 
Matsushita was 28.7 percent, which would translate into $6.68 of captured value.15 
 
Although smaller display sizes have tended to be more profitable than notebook and TV displays 
because there are so many smaller niches for different sizes and resolutions, the segment is still 
overcrowded, with Korean and Taiwanese entrants pursuing the Japanese market leaders.  
Toshiba-Matsushita Display saw its market rank fall from second at the beginning of 2005 to 
third by the end of the year, having been displaced since then by Sanyo-Epson, another Japanese 
joint venture.16  Toshiba’s Annual Report for the period ending March 2006 described the 
business environment facing Toshiba-Matsushita Display as “very tough... characterized by rapid 
price deterioration” (p.26).  The corporate gross margins of Sanyo (19 percent), Epson (18 
                                                
12 Gross profit rate calculated from data at http://www.toshiba.co.jp/about/ir/en/finance/pl.htm. 
13 Calculated from Edgar Online data accessed at http://finance.yahoo.com. 
14 “Hitachi Introduces 1.8-Inch Mobile Hard Disk Drive,” Hitachi Press Release, January 6, 2003. 
15 Matsushita margin of 31% for fiscal year ended March 2006 calculated from data at 
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/is?s=mc&annual. Toshiba margin was already discussed in the hard drive 
analysis. 
16 “Korean suppliers target small-to-medium-size display market, says iSuppli,” DigiTimes.com, October 
20, 2005 for first-quarter data and “iSuppli: Sharp and Sanyo Epson retain top spots in small- to medium-
size LCD market,” iSuppli Press Release, July 21, 2006 for fourth quarter data. 
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percent), and the sector leader, Sharp (23 percent), were even lower than those for Toshiba and 
Matsushita, so the 28.7 percent used here may be on the high side. 
 
The first inputs where we find some evidence of market power are the two primary microchips 
from U.S. companies Broadcom and PortalPlayer that control video playback and manage the 
iPod’s functions, respectively.  Their gross margins in 2005 were 52.5 percent and 44.8 percent, 
respectively, leading to an estimate of $6.60 in combined value captured.17  Broadcom’s is high 
enough to land in the supernormal range (more than one standard deviation from the mean) for 
the electronics industry. 
 
PortalPlayer, a Silicon Valley start-up founded in 1999, was a key partner in the iPod 
development process (Sherman, 2002).  PortalPlayer provided the main microchip and an 
accompanying reference design that controlled the iPod’s basic functionality, handling critical 
tasks like digital music processing and the user’s database management.18 
 
If PortalPlayer had any market power with Apple, it was dissipated by Apple’s centrality to 
PortalPlayer’s success.  In 2005, Apple’s subcontractors for iPod assembly accounted for 93 
percent of PortalPlayer’s sales.19  PortalPlayer’s above-average gross margin may therefore 
represent Apple’s acknowledgement of its supplier’s fragility; 2005 was only PortalPlayer’s 
second year of profitability. 
 
Although there is some short-term co-specialization, Apple is no more than one product revision 
(about 18 months) from being able to replace even a key supplier like PortalPlayer with 
acceptable switching costs.  This is in fact what happened in 2006 as Apple began designing 
iPods without PortalPlayer’s processors in them.  The chip company fell on hard times and was 
acquired by Nvidia, another chip company (Clarke, 2006). 
 
Broadcom, on the other hand, was a well-established chip supplier by 2005, when Apple selected 
it to add video playback to the iPod line.  Moreover, Broadcom had over a billion dollars in 
annual revenue and a diverse customer base, so it wasn’t dependent on Apple’s business.  
Broadcom’s strength lies in its proprietary technologies for designing chips and the efficiency (in 
terms of power usage, speed, etc.) of the algorithms the chips use to accomplish tasks such as 
decoding compressed video.  
 
In the case of the lithium-ion battery, Portelligent was not able to identify the supplier, nor were 
we able to do so through our own research.  The market for lithium-ion batteries is dominated by 
three Japanese companies, Sanyo, Sony, and Matsushita, who collectively account for more than 
                                                
17 Gross margins from http://finance.yahoo.com/q/is?s=BRCM&annual and PortalPlayer’s 10-K for the 
year ended December 31, 2005. 
18 A “reference design” is a generic design for a complete system, in this case a portable digital music 
player, that often includes a menu of features that can be customized according to the wishes of the client, 
or, as was more likely in this case, that can give some guidance to the client’s engineers as they develop 
their own system using, for example, a PortalPlayer-supplied software development kit. 
19 Portal Player’s 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2005. 
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half the market.20  Their respective gross margins in the fiscal year ending March 2006 were 18 
percent, 31 percent, and 31 percent21  Because Sanyo’s low margin appears to be due to 
problems in its non-battery lines of business,22 we assigned a gross margin of 30 percent to the 
Video iPod battery. 
 
A similar analysis was performed for the three types of memory chips from Samsung (main 
system memory; 28 percent gross margin), Spansion (non-volatile flash memory for retaining 
settings between uses; 10 percent gross margin), and Elpida (memory support for the video 
processor; 24 percent gross margin).23  The memory chip sector is notoriously volatile because of 
the difficulty of synchronizing demand and supply.  Spansion’s gross margin was particularly 
low because of weak revenue in 2005 as prices for Spansion’s NOR-type flash chips plummeted 
28 percent in response to excess supply.24 
 
There are hundreds more parts in a Video iPod, with a total combined cost of $22.79.  Due to 
lack of space, we will not enumerate the additional parts here.  The few that are most likely to 
earn a supernormal rate of return are some of the specialized microchips and customized 
mechanical parts such as several connectors that allow the iPod to achieve its tiny dimensions.  
These margins are impossible to determine by looking at financial statements alone, since the 
parts are so small relative to the suppliers’ total sales. 
 
 Manufacturing services 
Our estimate of the value captured by suppliers of manufacturing services (the placing of 
components on circuit boards, board testing, and final product assembly) required a different 
approach.  A fair amount of component insertion and final product assembly of electronics goods 
is outsourced to specialist suppliers of manufacturing services, especially by U.S. companies. 
 
All iPod manufacturing is outsourced to Taiwanese companies with factories in mainland China.  
Apple’s initial manufacturing partner for the iPod was Taiwan’s Inventec Appliances, which 
continues to handle the hard drive-based iPod models.25   
 
                                                
20 2002 market data from Institute of Information Technology, Japan, reported in NIST (2006).  
Subsequent mentions in the press (e.g. Tim Culpan, “Sony Battery Recall to Cause Shortage Until June, 
Makers Say,” Bloomberg.com, October 12, 2006) suggest that this is still the case. 
21 Calculated from data at http://www.hoovers.com/sanyo/--ID__41882,target__financial_information--
/free-co-samples-index.xhtml, http://finance.yahoo.com/q/is?s=SNE&annual, and 
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/is?s=mc&annual. 
22 Based on a review of business segment data in Sanyo Financial Statements: 
http://www.sanyo.co.jp/ir/e/library/pdf/financialstatements/fs-2006.pdf 
23 2005 gross margins from 
http://samsung.com/AboutSAMSUNG/ELECTRONICSGLOBAL/InvestorRelations/FinancialInformatio
n/AnnualFinancialSummary/Income.htm, http://finance.yahoo.com/q/is?s=SPSN&annual (Spansion), and 
http://investing.businessweek.com/businessweek/research/stocks/financials/financials.asp?symbol=6665.
T&dataset=incomeStatement&period=A&currency=US%20Dollar (Elpida). 
24 Spansion 10-K for the year ended December 25, 2005, “Net Sales Comparison for Fiscal 2005 and 
Fiscal 2004.” 
25 Levy (2006), Chapter “Origin.” 
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The reported gross margins of contract manufacturers tend to be small (Inventec Appliance’s 
margin for 2005 was 9 percent26), but this is misleading because they carry some of the 
components in their Cost of Goods Sold.  To count them against Inventec’s revenue and again as 
part of Apple’s factory cost would constitute double-counting. 
 
As a first approximation, we will treat assembly services, as estimated by Portelligent, as pure 
profit.  Because we are not discussing the profitability of assembly services further, estimating an 
amount for Inventec’s direct costs would not change the analysis that follows.  
 
The actual labor involved in a single iPod is limited and low-paid. Portelligent estimated that the 
final assembly of this model of iPod required about 10 minutes, and according to reports from 
Apple when it was defending itself against allegations that one of its subcontractors was abusing 
workers, the maximum hours per week at the factory were 60 and the minimum monthly wage 
was about $100, which works out to less than a penny per minute (Kurtenbach, 2006). 
 
As with key components, Apple would incur some switching costs to change manufacturing 
service providers.  However, these costs can be minimized by synchronizing them with a product 
revision, hence the power in the relationship is once again mostly on Apple’s side. 
 
 Distribution and retail 
Once the product is manufactured, there is still a great deal of value to be captured.  The retail 
price of the 30GB Video iPod at the time of Portelligent’s analysis was $299.  Based on our 
research, we estimate a 25 percent wholesale discount for each unit, with 10 percent for 
distribution and 15 percent for retail for both iPod models.27  
 
As with assembly services, we will again assume that payments for distribution and retail are 
pure profit without any implications for the analysis that follows.  Both the distribution and retail 
sectors are intensely competitive, with small reported margins. However, the incremental cost of 
shipping or selling a single iPod is quite small, so we have not used a corporate-level margin 
statistic.  
 
 Apple--the residual claimant on value 
Applying all these estimates to the retail price, we were able to arrive at an estimate of Apple’s 
gross margin on each 30GB Video iPod sold.  Apple is the lead firm in the iPod value chain, 
incurring costs for R&D, marketing, coordination of the entire value chain, and other overhead 
costs such as warranty.28  It is the residual claimant for value capture, as detailed in Table 2, in 
that it is the only company that bargains with all other actors in the value chain. 
                                                
26 Inventec Appliances Corporation Consolidation Financial Statements December 31, 2005 and 2004. 
27 A gross profit margin of “less than 15 percent” for non-Apple sales is claimed in Damon Darlin, “The 
iPod Ecosystem,” New York Times, February 3, 2006, so Apple’s wholesale discount would need to be at 
least this large. The distribution estimate is from an industry interview. A typical retail and distribution 
margin for another small consumer product, a $99 digital camera, is 24% (Siu Han and Adam Hwang, 
“Taiwan ODM/OEM digital camera makers to see more orders from Japan but shrinking net margins in 
2008, says Asia Optical,” DigiTimes.com, January 17, 2008). 
28 We examined whether warranty expenses were higher for Apple than for the notebook computer 
companies because of the iPod’s full exposure to the consumer market (as opposed to the notebook 
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Table 2.  Derivation of Apple’s Gross Margin on 30GB Video iPod 
 
Retail Price $299  
Distributor Discount (10%) ($30)  
Retailer Discount (15%) ($45)  
Sub-Total 
(estimated wholesale price) 
 
 
 
$224 
Factory Cost ($144)  
Remaining Balance 
(estimated Apple gross profit) 
 
 
 
$80 
Apple Gross Margin ($80/$224)  36% 
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text. 
 
Apple’s estimated gross profit on these units would be $80, which works out to a gross margin of 
36 percent of the $224 estimated wholesale price.  As a point of comparison, Apple’s reported 
corporate gross margin for all products in the year ending September 30, 2006 was 29 percent.29  
Apple’s corporate number reflects various iPod-related costs such as warranty expenses that are 
not included in our analysis, and also reflects margins for non-iPod products. 
 
Our $80 estimate of Apple’s gross profit is greater than the price of any single input, so it is 
definitely greater than the value captured by any of its partners.  And for sales through Apple’s 
own web or store outlets, it also captures the retailer discount of $45, giving it a gross margin of 
56 percent on those units. 
 
  Video iPod summary 
To summarize the preceding analysis, Apple received a slightly above-average, but still “normal” 
gross profit of 36%.  Only one of its key suppliers, Broadcom, appears to have achieved a gross 
margin in the supernormal range.  Most of the other parts suppliers, including those for the hard 
drive and the display, probably earned “normal” profits or less.  Subnormal profits were likely 
earned by one or two of the memory chip suppliers, who are among the most readily 
substitutable of the major inputs.  In every relationship with its suppliers, Apple has the greater 
market power. 
 
Hewlett-Packard Notebook PC 
 
We can similarly dissect the gross margins earned from the Hewlett-Packard notebook computer 
model nc6230, whose key inputs are detailed in Table A-3.  As expected, the leaders are 
Microsoft and Intel, with supernormal gross margins of 85 percent and 59 percent, respectively.  
Close behind Intel are other suppliers of logic chips, Broadcom (53 percent), Texas Instruments 
                                                                                                                                                       
industry’s mix of enterprise and consumer customers). Based on published data 
(http://www.warrantyweek.com/archive/ww20070508.html), Apple’s overall warranty expense as a share 
of sales is lower than that for the major computer manufacturers for the period 2003-2006. We also 
interviewed a former Apple employee (February 2007), who indicated that, although  warranty costs were 
considered too high in the iPod’s early years, return rates were gradually brought to an acceptable level 
even as sales volume rose substantially. 
29 Calculated from data at http://finance.yahoo.com/q/is?s=AAPL&annual. Gross margin for the 
preceding year was also 29%. 
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(48 percent) and Standard Microsystems (46 percent).  The supplier of a specialty memory chip, 
Hynix Semiconductor, also reported an above-average gross margin of 41 percent for the year. 
 
Near-average gross profit rates were reported by suppliers of the optical drive (31 percent), main 
memory (30 percent), and the battery (30 percent).  The lowest, but still near-average, margins 
were those of the graphics processor supplier, ATI Technologies (28 percent), display supplier 
Toshiba-Matsushita Display (28 percent), and the hard drive supplier, Fujitsu (26 percent). 
 
Assembly, distribution, and retail services were treated as above, but lower discount rates were 
used for distribution and retail because a notebook PC is a much more expensive product than an 
iPod ($1,399 versus $299).  Our estimates of notebook computer distribution and retail discounts 
are 5 percent and 10 percent, respectively.  Following these discounts, our estimate of the 
wholesale price received by Hewlett-Packard is $1,189 against our estimated factory cost of 
$856.  The difference of $333 gives Hewlett-Packard an estimated near-average gross margin of 
28 percent. In dollar terms, our estimates for Microsoft and Intel’s gross profits are $85 and 
$121, respectively, so HP earns the largest profit even though it’s much lower when expressed in 
margin terms.  The estimated notebook gross margin, which doesn’t reflect warranty and other 
direct expenses, is higher than HP’s overall gross margin of 24.3 percent in the fiscal year ending 
October 31, 2006. 
 
Product Comparisons 
 
Similar estimates of value capture were made for an older model of iPod and a Lenovo 
ThinkPad.  The results are shown in Table 3.  The earlier-generation iPod earned a slightly 
higher margin (40 percent) than the later version (36 percent), while the better-known ThinkPad-
branded notebook earned slightly more (30 percent) than the competing Hewlett-Packard model 
(28%).  However, for each pair of products, the margins are so close as to be within the 
uncertainty range of our estimates. 
 
Table 3.  Lead Firm Estimated Gross Margins for Four Products30 
 
 
Product 
Retail 
Price 
Estimated 
Wholesale 
Price 
Estimated 
Gross 
Profit 
Gross Margin 
(gross profit as 
percentage of 
wholesale price) 
30GB 3rd-Generation iPod, 2003 $399 $299 $119 40% 
30GB Video iPod, 2005 $299 $224 $80 36% 
Lenovo ThinkPad T43, 2005 $1,479 $1,257 $382 30% 
Hewlett-Packard nc6230, 2005 $1,399 $1,189 $333 28% 
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text. 
 
                                                
30 The product-specific gross margins in Table 3 are calculated as described in the text accompanying 
Table 2. They are different from the gross margins for inputs listed in the Appendix tables, because those 
are company-wide values from published corporate reports. 
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Apple’s iPod gross margins are generally higher than those for the two notebook models, but 
these would be partly dissipated by Apple’s extra overhead costs.31  As mentioned above, 
Apple’s in-house software was critical to the iPod’s success, but absent from the bill of 
materials.  Apple’s internal electrical and mechanical engineering capability, which determine 
important details like the quality of an audio circuit, the ability to pack components in a limited 
space, and the materials chosen for the case, add value to the raw components that make an iPod.  
 
Other lead firms vary in the level of internal engineering capability they maintain.  For example, 
HP relies more on ODMs for development engineering (mechanical and electrical engineering, 
PCB layout, and software engineering), whereas Lenovo relies more on the internal capability 
acquired with the IBM PC division (although Lenovo also outsources some models to ODMs).  
Both have their own design engineering capabilities for the critical task of establishing initial 
specifications that balance market demand and technology trends. 
 
For the makers of Intel-based computers, it is hard to get around the fundamental economics that 
siphon off a large share of industry profits to Microsoft and Intel. In the HP nc6230, for example, 
Intel and Microsoft combined have a gross margin of about 66 percent on components whose 
value equals about 30 percent of the wholesale price, which means their combined gross profit 
works out to 20 percent of the wholesale price.  Microsoft and Intel’s ownership and 
maintenance of valuable standards (operating system and processor architecture, respectively) 
allow them to charge a considerable premium for their components while making it harder for 
systems vendors like HP to differentiate their computers in the market.  Network effects that 
favor these inputs make it hard for computer companies to find alternate suppliers.  
 
If we compare the share of value capture (percent of wholesale price) in the Video iPod to that of 
the HP nc6230 (Figure 4), we see the following.  First, between the lead firms, Apple’s share of 
total value capture is significantly larger than HP’s share; second, Microsoft and Intel grab a 
large share of the gross profits from the PC, leaving less for HP and everyone else in the value 
chain.  We next look at how the iPod’s evolution contributed to Apple’s greater share of profits, 
and then explain the differences more generally in terms of the profiting from innovation 
literature in Section V below. 
 
                                                
31 For the company as a whole, a 29% gross margin for fiscal year 2006 falls to 10% net margin after all 
expenses. 
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Figure 4.  Value capture in Video iPod and HP notebook as percent of wholesale price 
 
Video iPod 30G HP nc6230 notebook 
  
Notes: Margins by country refer to gross margins associated with inputs produced by firms headquartered in that 
country (regardless of where the inputs were manufactured).  COGS is cost of goods sold, including purchased 
inputs and direct labor. 
 
 
Evolution and value capture of the iPod 
 
As noted earlier, the iPod is not just a hardware innovation, but an integrated system comprising 
the iPod product family and closely integrated with its iTunes software and iTunes Store.  Apple 
built up its iPod ecosystem in stages, as acceptance of the product justified additional effort.  The 
initial iPod, introduced in Fall 2001, was integrated with iTunes only on Apple’s own Macintosh 
platform.  Two years later, Apple added support for the Windows platform, greatly expanding 
the available market.  None of the technologies behind the iPod or iTunes were controlled 
exclusively by Apple, but the iPod, like the other music players at that time, was able to take 
advantage of a huge supply of complementary assets in the form of MP3 music files encoded 
from CDs or shared by users. 
 
This changed in April 2003 with the introduction of the iTunes Music Store (iTMS) which 
painstakingly negotiated cooperation from all the major music labels, critical complementors that 
Apple recognized and courted.  The iTMS (now called the iTunes Store) uses an exclusive 
system of digital rights management called FairPlay, which limits the number of computers on 
which the purchased tracks can be played.  More importantly, FairPlay-encoded tracks will not 
play back on any portable players other than the iPod or Apple-licensed players such as 
Motorola’s ROKR cell phone, since Apple has chosen not to license the system to other rivals. 
 
The combination of Apple’s iPod innovation, the first legal music downloading service with a 
large library, and its control of the underlying digital rights management system produced a 
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network effect that helped keep the iPod ahead of its many competitors.  To take advantage of 
this opportunity, Apple reportedly spent $200 million on advertising in the iPod’s first four 
years, which was far more than the advertising of its music-player rivals at that time.32 
 
The iPod case makes clear how a successful innovation creates the potential for a firm to retain a 
significant share of profits even when relying on a global network.  Apple maintains control over 
its supply chain by controlling essential elements such as core software, a proprietary standard, 
and valuable brand image.33  Table 4 shows how Apple’s total gross profit compares to that of 
other firms in the value chain for sales inside and outside the U.S. According to International 
Data Corporation (IDC), about 40 percent of hard-drive-based iPod sales are overseas.34  In the 
table, the gross margin for “Retail” has been subdivided to reflect our estimate of the share of 
Apple sales that are made through its website or its growing chain of Apple Stores.35 
 
Table 4 shows that Apple, the lead firm in the iPod value chain, fares significantly better than 
any of its partners.  The total value capture discussed so far, $80 for Apple, $75 for distribution 
and retail, and $39 for key inputs, totals $194.36  Apple captures 53 percent of the measured 
value from U.S. sales and 47 percent from sales outside the U.S. – well beyond the 18 percent 
captured by all suppliers of key parts or the shares for distribution and non-Apple retail.  These 
high shares underscore the importance of innovation and strategic management by a lead firm. 
 
                                                
32 Levy (2006), Chapter: Cool. 
33 For related theoretical discussions, see Chesbrough and Teece (1996) and Jacobides, et al. (2006). 
34 Estimated from data for 2006 in “Worldwide and U.S. Portable Media Player 2007-2011 Forecast and 
Analysis, “IDC Report #206016, March 2007. 
35 Apple, as reported in various issues of AppleInsider.com’s newsletter, has reported that about half of its 
overall sales are through direct channels, including its online and physical stores.  We assumed this was 
most relevant for U.S. sales, with international sales being dominated by indirect sales in part due to the 
limited presence of physical Apple Stores outside the U.S. 
36 We haven’t calculated gross margins for hundreds of smaller components costing $23.  At the industry-
average gross margin of 33 percent, they would add an additional $8 of value capture. 
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Table 4.  The Distribution of $194 of Captured Value in a Single 30GB Video iPod 
 
 Sales in the U.S. Sales outside U.S. 
Value Chain Segment Apple 
All other 
firms Apple 
All other 
firms 
Apple Gross Margin 
(development, software, 
marketing) $80 
 
$80  
Parts Suppliers (key inputs 
only, Table A-2)  
 
$35  $35 
Manufacturing  
(assembly, test)  
 
$4  $4 
Distribution  
 
$30  
 
$30 
Retail* $23 
 
$22 $11 $34 
TOTAL VALUE CAPTURE $103 
 
$91 $91 $103 
PERCENT OF TOTAL 53% 47% 47% 53% 
*“Retail” is split between Apple and other firms based on our estimate that one-half of all retail sales in the U.S. and 
one-quarter of all retail sales outside the U.S. are by Apple through its stores and online website. 
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text. 
 
 
V. Explaining Why Some Firms Capture More Value 
 
Our data show that lead-firm gross margins for iPods are slightly larger than for notebook 
computers.  Yet the average difference of 9 percent, while noteworthy, is less than half the 19.55 
standard deviation of large-firm gross margins reported earlier. 
 
What explains the difference in value capture between iPods and notebooks?  And why is it that 
Intel, Microsoft, and a handful of chip firms capture such high margins?  
 
In order to answer these questions, we look at the different position of these players in the 
computing industry with respect to the key factors that can determine whether a firm will capture 
most of the value generated by its own innovative efforts.  These include dominant design, 
appropriability regimes, complementary assets, and industry architecture. In the process, we 
show the relevance of these factors to the industry, while also providing new insights beyond the 
previous literature. 
 
Dominant Design 
The current physical configuration for notebooks (keyboard, palm rest, and pointing device) was 
established by Apple in the early 1990s.  Since then, almost everyone in the industry has 
innovated within the dominant physical design and the Wintel standard (except Apple).  As 
Teece (1986: 288) argued, “once a dominant design emerges, competition shifts to price and 
away from design,” while innovation tends to shift to the component level (Anderson & 
Tushman, 1990; Clark, 1985), and to process innovation, both of which have happened in 
notebook PCs.  This results in incremental innovation, with occasional supplier-generated 
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discontinuities such as 32-bit and 64-bit processing, graphical interfaces, multimedia, and 
wireless connectivity.  Those transitions have been managed by Intel and Microsoft with no 
threat to their position.  This situation has made it very difficult for PC makers to differentiate 
their products, so competition has driven down their margins.     
 
Apple’s ability to innovate at the system level in the newly-emerging market for music players 
contrasts with the situation facing HP and Lenovo in the notebook PC market.  The iPod was 
introduced before a dominant design was established for small digital music players, giving 
Apple a great deal of latitude in its design and integration choices.  With its success, the highly 
integrated iPod/iTunes system became a dominant design, to the extent that Microsoft followed 
its example closely with the Zune after shifting from its more modular, Wintel-like 
“PlaysForSure” certification program that pushed Windows Media formats.      
 
Appropriability  
In PCs, IBM lost control over the key interfaces by the late 1980s, which undermined its ability 
to appropriate the value of the system design it had created.  Microsoft and Intel capture a far 
larger share of profits than any iPod supplier and also have the highest margins in the PC 
industry.  IBM’s business-oriented ThinkPad line, introduced in 1992, was reportedly profitable, 
but any advantage it brought was unsustainable because of the ability of rivals to duplicate 
enough of its features over time, and IBM’s loss-making PC business was finally sold to Lenovo.  
By contrast, Microsoft has achieved a very high level of user lock-in to Windows (Shapiro & 
Varian, 1999), while Intel has used a combination of aggressive IP protection, R&D resources 
and scale economies to maintain its position in the face of challenges from various competitors 
over the years.  While they have sometimes dallied with other partners (e.g., Microsoft with 
AMD, Intel with Linux), the two have recognized a common interest in sustaining the two-way 
monopoly that has enriched both partners. 
 
By contrast, Apple kept control over key elements of the iPod, particularly the user interface, 
and, as the iPod ecosystem expanded, the interfaces between the iPod, iTunes software and the 
online iTunes Store.  Through this strategy, Apple has been able to capture by far the largest 
share of profits from its innovation in the iPod.  They have so far defended this position through 
an appropriability regime that includes extreme secrecy, refusing to open up their digital rights 
management system to others, a carefully crafted brand image, and possession of a great deal of 
tacit knowledge in the areas of industrial design and user interfaces that others have tried and 
failed to imitate.  Apple also has kept suppliers from gaining any significant market power by 
maintaining competition and being willing to switch key suppliers from one model to the next, as 
exemplified by the displacement of PortalPlayer’s processors in favor of Samsung’s in the most 
recent iPod models.  Few iPod owners are probably even aware of what microchips power their 
music player, and even fewer care because Apple has maintained the role of “guarantor of 
quality” (Jacobides, et al., 2006). 
 
Complementary Assets 
One aspect of complementarity where Teece’s original formulation proved inaccurate is 
manufacturing.  According to Teece (1986), “the notion that the United States can adopt a 
‘designer role’ in international commerce, while letting independent firms in other countries…do 
the manufacturing, is unlikely to be viable as a long term strategy.  This is because profits will 
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accrue primarily to the low cost manufacturers.”  Yet in our group of products, only China-based 
Lenovo retains some final assembly, while HP and Apple outsource all manufacturing.  While 
outsourcing is not universal throughout the electronics industry—Motorola and Nokia, for 
example, retain some final assembly, as do most of the major Japanese electronics companies—
for the most part, manufacturing has become a generic complementary asset, in the sense that the 
manufacturing equipment can be converted from one product line to another with relative ease. 
 
The lead firm and its manufacturing partner may share co-specialized assets to the extent that 
technologies have been transferred and the manufacturer has set up specific proprietary facilities 
as a result. But this level of asset specificity is unlikely to keep the partners committed to one 
another beyond a design cycle (one to two years) should conflict arise or another CM/ODM offer 
a lower price. 
 
Specialized complements are provided differently in the notebook PC and iPod ecosystems.  The 
specialized assets that are critical to the notebook PC include peripherals such as printers and 
cameras, expansion cards, and, most importantly, software applications.  For the iPod, they 
include PC software to capture and manage content and transfer it to the device, and various add-
ons such as speaker systems or car adapters.   
 
In the mature notebook PC ecosystem, specialized hardware accessories and software programs 
are developed independently to meet the open PC interface standards.  Hardware peripherals 
have become quite generic, as they mostly rely on standard USB or Firewire interfaces and only 
need specialized software drivers to run on different operating systems.  With the vast majority 
of PCs running on Windows and Intel-compatible processors, a huge supply of complementary 
assets is available, generating much of the value to PC owners, and in some cases very high 
profits to the providers of these assets (e.g., HP printers, Adobe software).   
 
For the iPod, Apple has employed a range of strategies to secure the necessary complements.  
The software in the iPod and the iTunes client software are developed by Apple internally.  
Specialized accessories such as speaker systems and car connectors that use Apple’s patented 
iPod connector (for which Apple receives a license fee) are provided mostly by third parties, as 
are lower-cost (but not necessarily low-margin) accessories such as cases. 
 
Apple’s most important complementary asset, content for iPod use, is mostly generic (not iPod-
specific) and comes from a variety of sources, only some of which required Apple’s 
involvement.  From the outset, consumers’ CD collections provided a ready content source that 
could be encoded as unrestricted MP3s on a computer and transferred to the iPod, free of charge, 
and Apple provided a free encoder in its iTunes software.37  The advent of unofficial filesharing 
services made millions of tracks available free online (albeit illegally).38  In this case, the 
unwilling providers of complementary assets made no money directly, although they may 
receive some promotional benefits for their content. 
                                                
37 Before iTunes, encoding software for the Macintosh needed to be purchased because of the license fee 
charged by the Fraunhofer Institute for the mp3 compression algorithm.  Apple bore the license cost even 
before the iPod in order to increase the attractiveness of the Macintosh platform. 
38 Apple isn’t unique in figuring out how to access free complements. Google figured out how to use the 
whole Internet to generate advertising revenue. 
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In addition, Apple provides access to millions of music tracks and other restricted content for 
paid download through its iTunes Store, with Apple receiving a small share of the profits.  Then 
in 2004, the “podcasting” phenomenon of syndicated free audio content caught on, and Apple 
began cataloguing the thousands of podcasts in the iTunes Store in 2005.39 
 
Another of the iPod’s complementary assets, and one that can be too easily overlooked, is 
Apple’s creation of its own brick-and-mortar retail channel.  Absent the Apple Stores, the iPod 
could have been relegated to a couple of shelves in a large retailer without the effective sales 
efforts and attractive displays of the Apple Store.  For the iPod, the Apple Store was a co-
specialized asset; the iPod needed such distribution, and the Apple Store needed a hot product to 
drive traffic in order to succeed.  This is consistent with Teece (1986), which pointed to retail 
distribution as an important complementary asset. 
 
Industry Architecture  
As mentioned earlier, the literature on profiting from innovation has searched for causality 
between industry and product architectures. As we pointed out, some of the confusion in this 
domain flows from the ambiguity of “industry.” 
 
The global electronics industry is frequently cited as the prototype of a modular industry 
architecture (Baldwin & Clark, 2000; Schilling & Steensma, 2001; Sturgeon, 2002), marked by a 
high degree of specialization, extensive use of outsourcing, and rapid innovation involving 
varying degrees of coordination among large numbers of companies to bring new technologies to 
market.40  This stands in contrast to industries such as automobiles and aerospace, whose 
products are more integral and industry structures more vertically aligned.  But while it is cited 
for its modularity, the broad electronics industry architecture is flexible enough to support both 
modular and integral product architectures. 
 
If we compare notebook PCs to iPods, two iconic electronics products that rely on the same 
supply base for displays, drives, chips, mechanical parts etc., we see that they are quite different 
in terms of both product and value chain architectures.  Notebook PCs are mostly modular, built 
on standard interfaces with mostly standard components.  By contrast, the iPod is much more 
integral, both in terms of hardware customization and tight integration of hardware and software.  
This could mean that product architecture and industry architecture are not as tightly linked as 
some have suggested, or at least that there is not a clear causal relationship. 
 
System Integration  
Given the decentralized industry structure of the electronics industry, systems integration has 
moved beyond being a technical endeavor to become a key strategic function in highly 
innovative industries (Prencipe, et al., 2003).  With innovation happening in different parts of the 
                                                
39 Despite the name, “podcasts” are unrestricted MP3 files, not limited to iPod use, but the use of the 
iPod-linked name and the iPod’s dominance of the media player market were mutually reinforcing. 
40 In practice, the points of contact in the electronics industry are less arm’s-length than in the ideal case, 
which gives rise to more interactive relationships that Gereffi, et al. (2005) call relational value chains.  
Whereas suppliers in modular networks make products to a set specification, the transactions in a 
relational network involve tacit knowledge or evolving specifications. 
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industry, someone must decide which technologies to incorporate into products, and then make 
those fast-changing elements work together in a product that is useful and affordable for 
customers.  Pisano and Teece (2007) say that "A firm’s ability to profit from innovation when 
there is considerable outsourcing depends importantly on whether the firm has world class 
capabilities in systems integration."  Our analysis supports this, but we find that systems 
integration can occur from the bottom up as well as the top down. 
 
The company determining the important aspects of a system is not necessarily the one whose 
brand name is on the outside of the final product.  In PCs, Microsoft and Intel evolved from just 
providing an operating system and processor to become the systems integrators of the Wintel PC.  
Intel moved into chipsets and even motherboards, setting standards for much of the hardware 
interfaces in the PC (Gawer & Henderson, 2007), such as PCI Express, while Microsoft has 
pulled more and more functionality into the operating system.  While the two sometimes 
disagreed, they generally cooperate to define how Wintel PC systems work, and to ensure 
compatibility across thousands of applications and peripherals.  PC makers carry out systems 
integration at a functional level, but most of the important system-level decisions have already 
been made by Microsoft and Intel. 
 
Other component suppliers have pursued a similar strategy, particularly vendors of microchips, 
whose ability to fit ever more transistors on a microchip has led to the so-called system-on-a-
chip (Linden & Somaya, 2003).  Such chips are sold not as stand-alone components but rather as 
“reference designs” that include recommended system circuitry, complementary components, an 
operating system, and software tools for developing customized applications.  Although 
sophisticated customers like Apple will add their own engineering expertise, as they did with 
PortalPlayer’s system-on-a-chip, less-sophisticated customers can use the reference design 
almost as delivered to reduce internal engineering overhead and reduce time-to-market. 
 
VI. Practical Implications 
 
The preceding analysis shows that Apple has benefited from following many of the prescriptions 
of the PFI model.  While its iPod profit advantage isn’t overwhelming, it has been enough to 
attract imitators who so far have fallen short.  Yet our analysis of two Windows-based notebook 
computers shows that near-normal profits are available for products with little differentiation 
apart from a brand name and some marginal design differences, but lower ongoing requirements 
for R&D. 
 
Because the electronics industry is a vast, open platform, the same set of complementary 
technologies is available to all firms.  System firms, especially those working within a dominant 
design, must find ways to gain advantage through strategies such as branding, marketing, 
industrial design, rapid product development, business model, or channel strategy.  Component 
firms must find unique ways to improve their customer’s value capture prospects through means 
such as new functionality, lower cost, or short time-to-market. 
 
A system or component firm that sets and controls a standard can earn above-average profits.  
Yet the opportunities to create a successful standard come only occasionally, usually before a 
dominant design is established.  The examples of Microsoft, Intel, and Apple are notable for their 
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rarity, and Apple’s dominant position in digital music players contrasts with its marginal position 
in the PC industry.  Still, while only a few firms in a value chain, if any, can earn supernormal 
profits, many can earn normal margins, and the system as a whole generates enough profits to 
support the continued rapid innovation that the electronics industry has seen for decades.   
 
The efforts of all the firms in the value chain affect the size of the pie by determining the cost 
and capabilities of the products being sold.  For instance, without a tiny hard drive or cheap flash 
memory or sophisticated software, there wouldn’t be an iPod as we know it, and without ODMs 
to make it in China, it would be more expensive.  Innovation means little if it doesn’t result in 
successful products, and there are roles for many companies to transform an idea into a business.  
While most have little ability to influence standards outcomes and must compete on cost, quality 
and service like any other business, there are always new opportunities to profit from innovation 
in a dynamic industry such as electronics.  Those most likely to do so apply systems integration 
skills to create value at the level of subsystem (e.g., TI, Broadcom), system (Intel), or ecosystem 
(Apple, Microsoft) in a way that creates some barriers to competitors from encroaching on their 
position. 
 
VII. Conclusions 
 
We have demonstrated a method for estimating the value captured by companies in the supply 
chain of a specific product.  Starting with industry analyst estimates of component pricing, we 
used additional firm-level data to calculate gross profit throughout the chain.  This methodology 
may be used by researchers studying different industries to identify who profits from innovation.   
 
Limitations of this methodology include the need for access to either internal company cost data 
or teardown reports, and the restriction of the analysis to the supply chain, excluding other 
complementors and rivals firms.  Another limitation is the absence of product volume 
information; firms may trade off a lower gross profit against higher volume because it allows 
them to allocate overhead over a larger revenue base. 
 
Because our method looks at the value chain of a given model rather than multiple models, it 
misses product variety.  Leading companies like HP or Lenovo field a complete range of 
notebook computers from high to low-end, each of which may have different profit targets.  
According to Portelligent, the Lenovo model considered here may have been targeted “at the 
value-business market more than the traditional high-end ThinkPad buyer” with the HP notebook 
roughly similar.  Consumer models might have told a different story.  Similarly, the hard-drive-
based iPods analyzed here were at the high end of Apple’s media player line.  Apple sells more 
units of the lower-priced, flash-based Nano, which will have a different gross margin profile. 
 
Our results show the usefulness of our estimation method by demonstrating that profitable niches 
abound, in both a closed architecture such as Apple’s iPod family, in which the lead firm sets all 
the interfaces, and in the more open PC architecture whose key interfaces are set by upstream 
suppliers.  Seeing the relative profitability of different participants in the value chain will benefit 
both scholars studying the profits from innovation, and business people looking to capture more 
profit for their firms. 
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We analyzed our results further from the perspective of the “profiting from innovation” (PFI) 
model and found solid empirical support for the theory.  Our analysis has been based on 
systematic, empirical analysis of the value captured by various participants along the value chain 
augmented by additional industry knowledge. 
 
The analysis confirms the usefulness of the core constructs of technology evolution, 
appropriability, and complementary assets.  It also suggests that the recent emphasis on system 
integration skills as an important factor in firms’ ability to profit from innovation is merited.  On 
the other hand, the analysis shows the difficulty of applying the “industry architecture” branch of 
the PFI model in a causal model, and discussed implications for firms of the availability of a 
broad “electronics industry” supply base. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A-1.  Key Inputs in the 30GB 3rd-Generation iPod, 2003 
Type Input Supplier 
Supplier HQ 
Country 
Estimated 
Input Price 
Price as % of 
Factory Cost 
Supplier 
Gross Profit 
Rate 
Estd. Value 
Capture 
Storage Hard drive Toshiba Japan $112.00  62% 26.90% $30.18  
Processor Controller chip PortalPlayer US $6.18  3% 41.40% $2.56  
Display 
Monochrome display 
assembly ? Japan* $5.81  3% 20%* $1.16  
Memory  SDRAM - 32MB Samsung Korea $5.23  3% 32.30% $1.69  
Battery Battery pack ? Japan* $3.46  2% 30%* $1.04  
    Sub-Total $132.68  74%     
    Other Parts $42.64  24%     
    Estimated assembly and test $4.87  3%   $4.87  
    Estimated factory cost $180.19  100%   $41.50  
* - supposition 
Source: Portelligent, Inc., 2003 and authors’ calculations. 
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Table A-2.  Key Inputs in the 30GB 5th-Generation iPod (Video iPod), 2005 
Type Input Supplier 
Supplier HQ 
Country 
Estimated 
Input Price 
Price as % of 
Factory Cost 
Supplier 
Gross Profit 
Rate 
Est’d. 
Value 
Capture 
Storage Hard Drive Toshiba Japan $73.39  51% 26.50% $19.45 
Display Display Assembly 
Toshiba- 
Matsushita Japan $23.27  16% 28.70% $6.68 
Processors 
Video/Multimedia 
Processor Broadcom US $8.36 6% 52.5% $4.39 
Processors Controller chip PortalPlayer US $4.94 3% 44.8% $2.21 
Battery Battery Pack Unknown Japan* $2.89 2% 30%* $0.87 
Memory 
Mobile SDRAM 
Memory - 32 MB Samsung Korea $2.37 2% 28.2% $0.67 
Memory 
Mobile RAM - 8 
MBytes Elpida Japan $1.85 1% 24.0% $0.46 
Memory 
NOR Flash 
Memory - 1 MB Spansion US $0.84 1% 10.0% $0.08 
   Sub-Total $117.910 82%     
    Other parts $22.790 16%     
    Estimated assembly and test $3.860 3%   $3.86 
    Estimated factory cost $144.56 100%   $38.66 
* - supposition 
Source: Portelligent, Inc., 2006 and authors’ calculations. 
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Table A-3.  The Most Expensive Inputs in the Hewlett-Packard nc6230 Notebook PC, 2005 
Type Input Supplier 
Supplier HQ 
Country 
Estimated Input 
Price 
Price as % of 
Factory Cost 
Supplier 
Gross 
Profit Rate 
Est’d. 
Value 
Capture 
Processors Main chipset + Wi-Fi Intel US $205.43 24.0% 59% $121.20  
Processors Graphics Processor ATI Technologies US $20.50  2.4% 28% $5.74  
Processors 
Ethernet controller w/ 
Transceiver Broadcom US $2.01  0.2% 53% $1.07  
Processors Cardbus Controller 
Texas 
Instruments US $3.28  0.4% 48% $1.57  
Processors I/O Controller 
Standard Micro-
systems (SMSC) US $1.42  0.2% 46% $0.65  
Processors Battery Charge Controller 
Texas 
Instruments US $1.22  0.1% 48% $0.59  
Display Display Assembly 
Toshiba 
Matsushita 
Display Japan $137.14 16.0% 28% $38.40  
Software 
Windows XP Pro OEM 
license Microsoft US $100.00 11.7% 85% $85.00  
Storage 60GB Hard Drive Fujitsu Japan $68.00  7.9% 26% $17.68  
Storage DVD-ROM/CD-RW Drive Matsushita Japan $40.00  4.7% 31% $12.40  
Memory Memory Board (512 MB) Samsung Korea $29.65  3.5% 30% $8.90  
Memory 
DDR SDRAM Memory 
2x32 MB 
Hynix 
Semiconductor Korea $5.68  0.7% 41% $2.33  
Battery Battery Pack Unknown Japan* $40.52 4.7% 30%* $12.16  
    Sub-Total $654.85 76.5%   
    Other parts $177.72 20.8%   
    Estimated assembly and test $23.76 2.8%  $23.76 
    Estimated factory cost $856.33 100.0%  $331.44  
* - supposition 
Source: Portelligent, Inc., 2005b and authors’ calculations. 
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Table A-4.  The Most Expensive Inputs in the Lenovo ThinkPad T43 Notebook PC, 2005 
Type Component Supplier 
Supplier HQ 
Country 
Estimated 
Factory 
Price 
Price as 
% of 
Factory 
Cost 
Supplier 
Gross 
Profit 
Rate Estd. Value Capture 
Main chipset + Wi-Fi Intel US $205.34  23.5% 59% $121.15 Main chipset + Wi-Fi 
Graphics processor ATI Technologies US $21.70  2.5% 28% $6.08 Graphics processor 
Microcontroller Renesas Japan $2.83  0.3% 24% $0.68 Microcontroller 
Power Supply Monitor / 
Controller Toshiba Japan $2.11  0.2% 26% $0.55 
Power Supply Monitor / 
Controller 
Single Chip LAN Controller Broadcom US $2.01  0.2% 53% $1.07 Single Chip LAN Controller 
PC Card Controller Ricoh Japan $1.81  0.2% 42% $0.76 PC Card Controller 
power management ASIC IBM US $1.42  0.2% 40% $0.57 power management ASIC 
Microcontroller Philips Europe $1.16  0.1% 32% $0.37 Microcontroller 
Display Module 
Toshiba-Matsushita 
Display Japan $138.32  15.8% 28% $38.73 Display Module 
Windows XP Pro Microsoft US $100.00  11.4% 85% $85.00 Windows XP Pro 
60GB Hard Drive Hitachi Japan $68.00  7.8% 23% $15.64 60GB Hard Drive 
CD / DVD Drive  
Hitachi-LG Data 
Storage Japan $40.00  4.6% 25% $9.80 CD / DVD Drive  
Li-Ion Battery Pack Sony Japan $41.06  4.7% 37% $15.19 Li-Ion Battery Pack 
Memory Module  Hynix Korea $29.68  3.4% 41% $12.17 Memory Module  
32MB DDR SDRAM Hynix Korea $5.68  0.6% 41% $2.33 32MB DDR SDRAM 
    Sub-Total $661.12  75.5%     
    Other parts $192.21 22.0%     
    
Estimated assembly and 
test $21.86 2.5%   $21.86 
    Estimated factory cost $875.19 100.0%   $331.94 
Source: Portelligent, Inc., 2005a and authors’ calculations. 
 
